Revisiting Aquinas's Proof Of Original Sin

Aquinas and Original Sin

In a rather brief way Thomas Aquinas addressed what he conceived to be a reasonably solid proof of original sin. His argument was made in the Summa Theologica Book 4, Ch. 51:

"In the preceding chapters we have shown there is nothing impossible in what the Catholic Faith affirms concerning the Incarnation of the Son of God: and consequently we must now show that it was fitting for the Son of God to take to Himself human nature. Seemingly, the Apostle assigns as a reason of this fittingness, original sin which was contracted by all men. Thus he says (Rom. v. 19): As by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners; so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just. Since, however, the Pelagian heretics denied original sin, we must prove that men are born in original sin. In the first place we must quote the words of Gen. ii. 15, 17: The Lord God took man, and put him into paradise . . . And he commanded him saying: Of every tree of paradise thou shalt eat: but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat. For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death. Seeing, however, that Adam did not actually die on the very day on which he ate, the words, Thou shalt die the death must be understood to mean, Thou shalt be under the ban of death. Now there would be no purpose in saying this if man were created with the necessity of dying. Consequently we must say that death and the necessity of dying is a punishment inflicted on man for sin. Now a punishment is not inflicted justly except on those who are guilty. Therefore in all who are thus punished there must be some guilt. Now all men are punished thus, even from the moment of their birth: for as soon as he is born man is under the ban of death, so that some die as soon as they are born, and are taken from the womb to the grave. Therefore some kind of sin is in them. But this is not actual sin, for infants have not the use of free-will, without which no sin is imputed to a man, as appears from what we have stated above. We must conclude, then, that they have contracted original sin."

It appears that Aquinas asserts that there is reason to believe the pains that we go through in this life such as death, weakness, and hunger, are in fact punishments, and that since those born into such punishments did not themselves commit any act to deserve such punishments, that this indicates some fault of nature was committed on behalf of the human race, aka original sin. 

The specific reasoning Aquinas has for reasoning that death, weakness and hunger are in fact punishments are not fully hashed out in the said argument, and his critics clearly have recognized this fact. The most potent of possible objections to this argument is rather simple: one could simply state that death, hunger, and weakness are all parts of our intended nature rather than punishments enacted for a fall in another original nature. So the question to be answered is truly "Knowing what we know about God and the nature that we currently possess, what can we conclude regarding our own original design?" Thus is it that Aquinas later notes in the proceeding chapter the following reply:

"We must, in the first place, observe that there are certain probable signs of original sin in the human race. For since God watches over men's actions, so as to assign rewards to good deeds, and punishments to evil deeds, as we have already shown, we can conclude that where there is punishment, there has been sin. Now the whole human race suffers various punishments, both bodily and spiritual. Of bodily punishments the chief is death, to which all others are conducive and subordinate, such as hunger, thirst, and so on. Of spiritual punishments, the principal is weakness of reason, the result being that man encounters difficulty in acquiring knowledge of the truth, and easily falls into error; also that he is unable wholly to overcome his animal propensities, which sometimes even obscure his mental vision. Someone however might reply that these defects, whether of body or of soul, are not penalties but natural defects, and a necessary consequence of the conditions of matter. For the human body, being composed of contrary elements, must needs be corruptible; and the sensitive appetite must needs incline to things in which the senses delight, and which at times are contrary to reason. Again, the possible intellect is in potentiality to all things intelligible, and has none of them actually, but has by its very nature to acquire them through the senses, and therefore with difficulty acquires the knowledge of truth, and is easily led astray by the imagination.

Nevertheless, if we look at the matter rightly, it will appear sufficiently probable that, divine providence having fitted each perfection to that which is to be perfected, God has united a higher to a lower nature in order that the former might dominate the latter, and, should any obstacle to this dominion arise through a defect of nature, God by a special and supernatural act of kindness would remove it. Wherefore, since the rational soul is of a higher nature than the body, we believe that it was united to the body under such conditions, that there can be nothing in the body to oppose the soul whereby the body lives: and in like manner, if reason in man is united to his sensual appetite and his other sensitive powers, that reason is not hindered by the sensitive powers, but, on the contrary, dominates them. Hence, according to the teaching of faith, we affirm that man was, from the beginning, so fashioned that as long as his reason was subject to God, not only would his lower powers serve him without hindrance; but there would be nothing in his body to lessen its subjection; since whatever was lacking in nature to bring this about God by His grace would supply. Whereas no sooner did his reason turn away from God than his lower powers rebelled against his reason, and his body became subject to sufferings that counteract the life it receives from the soul. Accordingly, although these defects seem natural to man absolutely, if we consider his nature from its lower side, nevertheless, if we consider divine providence, and the dignity of the higher part of man's nature, it can be proved with sufficient probability that these defects are penal, and consequently that the human race was originally infected with sin. Having made these remarks, let us now turn our attention to the objections." 

Aquinas assumes that God would be more than capable, and fully wanting, to create a creature that was inclined in all aspects to bring glory to God, which would in fact be the very purpose for the creation of the creature to begin with. Thus, for God to create man with a nature that is subject to contrary passions, with no means of the higher order to control the lower order, would seem to be contradictory to the said purpose of our creation. To further elucidate on why we can more than reasonably assume that this is the case, the following includes a brief analysis.

Why Our Current Nature Should Be Understood As Fallen

Our daily lives inevitably become the standard of normality for us. This is especially true when our assumptions about who we are seem to be verified by experience with other people from all walks of life. Thus we can become rather cynical people; it seems to us, and it is not wrong to say so, that every person from every nation is a jerk. But it is when we extend this experience through time and thought that we begin to encounter trouble. While our own world as we know it is certainly filled with some annoying individuals, this might not have always been the case, nor might it always be the case. Our current nature might very well have been subject to different conditions and understood differently at a different point in time, and it is likely to be understood differently in coming points of time. Thus, as reasonable people we must not be too quick to think the current conditions we experience are the only form of how human life can be experienced. With this simple notion in mind, we can now delve further into the specifics of why it is more reasonable to believe the current conditions of our nature are not conditions written within our original design.

Before we do delve too deep though, it should further be understood what Aquinas might mean by stating death, hunger, and weakness are 'punishments'. Aquinas elsewhere states that original sin's primary punishment is a subjection to the self's will, or more precisely a subjection of our higher ordered intention (full beatific vision) to our our lower ordered intention (temporal and physical understanding). Death, hunger and weakness are only a more visible embodiment of this primary want of and for the self, interpreted as punishments to the self's desire. This leads us to believe that the punishments of death, hunger and weakness are punishments precisely because they are pains centered around the more primary desire of our want for life, food and strength. We strive for our own visions, and so we face the punishment of a death of the opportunity to contribute these ideas to the world. We strive for temporal pleasures in food, and so we face pain when we consume too much and too little. We desire to be right and strong in whatever capacity we might imagine, and so we face physical and mental weakness in our ignorance. Thus the true discussion to be having is not centered around whether these occurrences and effects of nature are punishments or only 'natural', but if the inherent want that these effects of nature make clear is within original design. This want should be understood not only in terms of conscious or spiritual desire (though present) but in physical want and dependency; we truly spiritually and physically hunger for temporal things, in a way in which though still free in will, we nonetheless must engage in to sustain our lives. Another point to add is that it is this want that effectively engenders the opportunity of sin according to our current nature; because we so desire invariably the self's will, we are subject to invariably the self's obvious imperfect reasoning and moral decisions. The claim of whether this want is inherent in a way that is primary to our lives, or intended in original design, must now be analyzed using what we know of God and ourselves. 

It should immediately seem odd that God would create a thing with an inherent and actualized want for that which is less or other than God. If the purpose for which God creates a thing can reasonably be argued as being to bring about His glory, for all other purposes are less in importance than this purpose, it would make little sense for God to unnecessarily embed a creation with a habit that invariably leads to sin, which is the ultimate offense against God. This leads to another point. It could very well be argued that if man's original design includes a want for temporal matter, in such a way that this want and proceeding sin cannot be avoided, than God could very well be seen to be cruel. Essentially, a soul by no fault of its own would be embedded with a habit to sin that cannot be ignored nor bypassed, and so this creation would have no opportunity to freely experience God's love. If one believes that this soul could be saved by a means of salvation, necessarily coming from and by God, this solution is subject to circular reasoning, for God would essentially be satisfying a debt that He actively engendered. For the effect of any sin, as the action of sinning is an effect, is actualized by its preceding cause. Though free will would be the means of this sin even in this system, the ultimate cause would still be a cruel one in its damaging influence of the said free will. But God cannot be cruel, for it can reasonably be proven that God is justice itself. Cruelty is a trait of one subject to degrees of variables not acting in alliance with justice. God, by Aquinas's philosophical proof, cannot be subject to any such degrees of judgement as derived by natural law but rather is the very end of justice that natural law derives. 

Perhaps we have briefly seen why it is reasonable to dismiss the idea that inherent want for that other than God is logically probable and sound, but we are still left with the problem thereafter of the source of sin. For where we might now assert that mankind's original design did not include a habit of sin, we still have to answer why man sinned to begin with if there were not some actual evil in him.

The Doctrine Of Original Sin

Perhaps the best place to clearly understand what is meant by 'original sin' is the Catechism of the Catholic Church. Its pages regarding original sin can be found here. Some of its wordage has been posted below:

"396 God created man in his image and established him in his friendship. A spiritual creature, man can live this friendship only in free submission to God. The prohibition against eating 'of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil' spells this out: 'for in the day that you eat of it, you shall die.' The 'tree of the knowledge of good and evil' symbolically evokes the insurmountable limits that man, being a creature, must freely recognize and respect with trust. Man is dependent on his Creator, and subject to the laws of creation and to the moral norms that govern the use of freedom.
397 Man, tempted by the devil, let his trust in his Creator die in his heart and, abusing his freedom, disobeyed God's command. This is what man's first sin consisted of. All subsequent sin would be disobedience toward God and lack of trust in his goodness.
398 In that sin man preferred himself to God and by that very act scorned him. He chose himself over and against God, against the requirements of his creaturely status and therefore against his own good. Constituted in a state of holiness, man was destined to be fully 'divinized' by God in glory. Seduced by the devil, he wanted to 'be like God', but 'without God, before God, and not in accordance with God'.
399 Scripture portrays the tragic consequences of this first disobedience. Adam and Eve immediately lose the grace of original holiness. They become afraid of the God of whom they have conceived a distorted image - that of a God jealous of his prerogatives.
400 The harmony in which they had found themselves, thanks to original justice, is now destroyed: the control of the soul's spiritual faculties over the body is shattered; the union of man and woman becomes subject to tensions, their relations henceforth marked by lust and domination. Harmony with creation is broken: visible creation has become alien and hostile to man. Because of man, creation is now subject 'to its bondage to decay'. Finally, the consequence explicitly foretold for this disobedience will come true: man will "return to the ground", for out of it he was taken. Death makes its entrance into human history.
401 After that first sin, the world is virtually inundated by sin There is Cain's murder of his brother Abel and the universal corruption which follows in the wake of sin. Likewise, sin frequently manifests itself in the history of Israel, especially as infidelity to the God of the Covenant and as transgression of the Law of Moses. And even after Christ's atonement, sin raises its head in countless ways among Christians. Scripture and the Church's Tradition continually recall the presence and universality of sin in man's history."

Unlike the proposition that our current nature is our originally designed nature, what is more present in the doctrine of original sin is the suggestion that we were made with a more perfect nature that was more inclined to God that fell through disobedience. Rather than being created corrupted, with a nature already actualized in want, containing relevant and invariable habits to sin, the doctrine of original sin states that we were created with a potential of corruption (corruptibility), with a nature that could be actualized in want if our higher order of our original design loved too strongly the lower order of our original design. The difference between the suggestion that we have always had this nature of want and the suggestion that this nature of want has come as the result of a fall can be summarized with a comparison. The first intends that we possess by original design a habit to serve the self and to sin, while the latter states that such a habit follows as consequence to a choice of sin that damaged original justice. 

So in effect, God did not create an actualized want/habit in accordance to some want of temporal matter. Such would be both contradictory to the purpose for creation and the justice that is understood to be God's own nature. Rather, the doctrine of original sin asserts that God created a perfect nature in man that could fall only because it was not God who is perfection itself. The matter of the fall, the question of what specifically actualized the will to fall, is not an existent evil nature or habit within mankind's original design but rather the good will of mankind deceived and pulled to that which is less than God. So it is entirely possible that out of an entirely good thing comes wickedness and evil, for though entirely good in itself, the direction of the will can in fact become misaligned with the highest good by loving a lesser good. Thus does Aquinas state that a 'higher order' fell to a 'lower order'. 

This satisfies a purely philosophical answer, but many wish to see how the doctrine of original sin can be evidenced in our actual lives. If one is a Christian they already see a great deal of original sin, though not necessarily in its isolated form.  For the very reason Christ suffered on this earth was in order to pay penance for original sin. The sacrament of baptism is given to babies not for actual sin, but rather for original sin. For the non-Christians, the doctrine of original sin can be seen in the very prevalent sense that we all have of a higher and lower order. Though we do not all believe in God, most individuals do not deny that there is some structure of morality. If one is a relativist, it must be considered wrong to not believe in relativism, or else one denies that there is any worth to believing in relativism. There thus exists some idea of good and evil, of intellect and animalism, and of chastity and lust that every society and individual knows. Of course, Aquinas thus goes into natural law with such observations, but such a discussion must wait for later. For now, suffice it to say that the doctrine of original sin bears its weight well against its objectors. 

Philosophical Musings on the Trinity

Not this Trinity

The Christian doctrine of the Trinity is the most commonly held belief among Christians, and to a certain degree it has become a litmus test for Christians. While Catholics and Protestants might have ample disagreements regarding theological ideas such as papal universal jurisdiction, the Sacrament of Confession, the nature of Christ's Passion and Sacrifice, and prayer to saints, when it comes to who God essentially is, the term Trinity pops up instinctively in both circles of thought. So what is this mysterious unifying doctrine that, despite its complexities, has still managed to eclipse denominational differences? 

This of course is a question that shall not be answered in full over a blog post. Some things remain mysterious, with only small opportunities for clarity in understanding (hence the picture above). This mystery shall remain ever more so since the purpose of this blog is not to regard Scripture in all capacity when referring to the Trinity (and so remain in safe and accepted ground), but to keep Scripture in the back of our minds, so to say, as we discuss a more philosophical question; can the Trinity be proven to be true through natural reason?

To regard this question firstly requires addressing the first question of what the Trinity is, and here we shall use traditional and generally more solid understanding. 

Holy Trinity. 

the union of three persons (Father, Son, and Holy Ghost) in one Godhead, or the 

threefold personality of the one Divine Being. 

It is the latter half of the definition that applies to the serious philosopher. This is not to dismiss the important imagery of God as three persons, but it is to say that this image is precisely that; an image, used primarily for the purpose of offering an easier, though perhaps less accurate, understanding of the Godhead. This definition in itself, though telling us that God is (according to the claim) three 'persons' in one Godhead, tells us very little of who God is as a whole. For this understanding it is best to turn to the granddaddy of traditional theology; St. Augustine. According to Augustine, "God is being itself." St. Thomas Aquinas later verified this belief in far more philosophical detail, describing God as pure actuality, the foundation of all beings, in short "being itself". Before you freak out and state that God is 'all loving, all good, all etc', this classical theist understanding of God in no way conflicts with these notions; in fact, they only confirm them.

The fact of our existence verifies that though we are obviously unnecessary beings God desired to create us, not for the gaining of anything on His part but for the spreading of His goodness to beings and creation. As such, God is all loving. But St. John describes God as not only 'all loving' but as love itself; "God is love". This sounds strikingly similar to "God is being". The idea is that love and goodness are not simply traits of God, but that they are who God is. What is 'love' is God, and in submitting to love we submit to God Himself. Granted, this might begin to sound like God is simply a 'force' without personality, an 'energy' to be drawn upon by the Universe. But the opposite is the truth. We are told that we are made in the image of God (see Genesis). If such is so, we can imagine God to be something similar to us; possessing a will, an awareness and an intellect. Besides referring to Genesis we can also conclude by necessity that God is all these things (I suggest reading Aquinas for further discussion) For now, suffice it to say that, in the words of St. John, "God is love."

So we know that God is not only a being among many, possessing the trait of love, but rather that God is being and love itself. We know that God is a threefold personality. So how do these two ideas relate to each other? More so, can the latter be proven in the same way the former can?

The latter question shall be tackled here and in doing so the first question is answered...

I note beforehand that even if the Trinity cannot be proven philosophically, this is in no sense a reason to abandon it. The nature of God can only be known to a point by human reason, and only a fool thinks that they can truly understood the full implications and meaning of God. If we fail to prove the Trinity it is more so an implication of our lowly nature than it is that the Trinity is false. This is because the Trinity was revealed to mankind predominantly through the Son, and not through natural reason, and it is only through similar revelation that any soul is saved. We do not achieve our own salvation anymore than stories write themselves. 

This being said, it seems that this single question has hardly been asked. This could be due to several reasons. Firstly, the fact that its existence is revealed through revelation in Christ brings little reason for souls to question if it could be revealed and proved in any other way besides revelation. When your teachers reveal to you new information you rarely question where they got the information, but rather if the information is true or not. The former question might follow, but only for those who doubt the validity of the information and likewise spend a decent amount of time thinking about the specific piece of information. Granted that most Christians don't doubt the trinity specifically for long periods of time (there may be exceptions of course) and that those who do doubt the trinity likely are only doubting the trinity peripheral to a more general doubt of God, the actual time spent to think about a potential philosophical proof for the trinity likely rarely surfaces. Secondly, the presumptions involved in the case are likely to scare many serious Christian philosophers away from the question. A proof of the Trinity involves working on the presumption that we know what God is. As shown above we can know God to be like certain characterizations more than others, but each characterization hardly does justice to the real thing, and is hardly understood by even those putting such proofs together. We can say that God is pure actuality and pure love, but the actual meaning of such words are not fully witnessed and understood through intellect, for they are outside of human capacity. Thirdly and lastly, the fact that it seems as though no serious Christian philosopher has attempted to seriously compose a proof of the trinity is a very scary and daunting task for any subsequent Christian philosophers. No one wants to be 'that guy' who put together a failed argument in his/her ambition. 

One influential voice from the past that thought a philosophical proof of the trinity was gibberish is none other than St. Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas:

"It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained (12, 4, 12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason except from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God, as effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can know of God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as the principle of things, and we have cited this fundamental principle in treating of God as above (Question 12, Article 12). Now, the creative power of God is common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence, and not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore, by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons."

As one can see, the task of 'proving the trinity' in a philosophical sense is likely to be met with disappointment. Aquinas provides perhaps the best reason for this. Aquinas believes that while one can prove the general nature or essence of God, one cannot prove in a classical sense the roles and delegations of any specific 'person' of God. In other words, our natural reason can get us to the point of saying 'God is love', but it cannot get us to the point of saying 'God is a lover, a beloved, and the love shared between the two'. 

Despite all of this doubtful talk, I hold [drum roll please] that the trinity can be proven through natural reason. Aquinas holds that we can only know God's essence, and that this essence is "common to the whole Trinity". But in knowing a general essence we can also deduce certain realities about such an essence. Just as knowing that an organic material is human can reveal further truths about the said organic material, so too can knowing that God is love reveal further philosophical truths about God. To illuminate what I mean perhaps it is best to explain in full the philosophical proof I hold for the trinity. The following in no way must be correct for me to still have confidence in my Christian faith and I certainly don't expect (nor hope) it to be necessary for you to retain your Christian faith. I doubt that it is entirely true to be frank. The entirety of God is most definitely not on display in the argument, for in agreeing with Aquinas, natural reason cannot conceive of the full being of God. That being said, the proof is as follows:

1.) The ultimate end of a desire actualizes the desire.

2.) In this way, if one loves a thing, the reception of love on part of the end of a desire, aka the object of love, actualizes the desire into full being. So the desire is dependent for actualization upon the actuality of the end/object of the desire.

3.) The actualization of desire by the object of desire engenders another, separate state of realized love as shared between the two, rather than realized within the self of either.

4.) The resulting state of love that is 'being' is distinct from either the love given or the love received, since neither form in themselves and alone can generate the state of love generated between the two.

5.) With this in mind, it can reasonably be claimed that God is love (see Aquinas philosophical proofs and St. John for Scriptural proofs)

6.) Granted that God is thus all-loving, as His creation we are the object of His desire/will/love. 

7.) But creation cannot be the ultimate end, or object, of God's intention, since the intention is dependent upon the ultimate end in order to be actualized. God being pure actuality is not dependent upon that which is not pure actuality. God, being entirely necessary, is not dependent upon that which is not.

8.) So God Himself must be the ultimate end/primary object of God's intention. This aspect of God, named the ultimate end, must be in some way of self-orientation different than God's intention, for the fact that God's intention bears in mind that other than itself while God's end bears in mind only God's intention, which is the satisfaction God demands. 

9.) If God is both desire/will and the ultimate end of such a desire and will, God achieves His own condition of love, and a consciousness of this awareness.

10.) God as desire/will is known as the Father, God as the ultimate object of desire/will is known as the Son, and the state of love proceeding from the Father and Son is known as the Holy Spirit.

So there you have it. There is my quaint 'proof of the trinity'. I could be wrong. I might not be. Either way, my thoughts do not dictate the state of my confidence in the Trinity as primarily revealed to us in Jesus Christ, Lord and Savior.